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THE TRUE «AMERICAN RULE" 

DRAFTING FEE LEGISLATION 

IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 

Mary Frances Derfner* 
One of the most fertile fields for new legIslatIon m the past 
decade has been the field of court awarded attorneys fees. The tra­
ditional Amencan Rule, whICh IS umque among the common law 
nations of the world, provIdes that all partIes to the litigation pay 
theIr own attorneys fees, regardless of the outcome. 1 Federal 
courts are permitted to assess the fees of the wmnmg litigant 
agamst the losmg party m only limited CIrcumstances, the most 
common bemg when a federal statute provIdes for such fee shift­
mg. 2 Pnor to the 1960's, the fee statutes whICh Congress adopted 
were relatively few and were only rarely used. Begmnmg with 
that decade, however an attorneys fees revolutIOn took place. As 
Congress began to pass CIvil nghts and public mterest laws, it rec­
ogmzed that pnvate enforcement was essential to make the new 
laws effective, and that mcenhves to litigate were essentIal to pro­
mote pnvate enforcement. The result was the creatIOn of a speCieS 
Director, Attorneys Fees ProJect, Lawvers Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law. 
1. The system whICh prevails elsewhere IS known vanously as the English 
rule, the continental rule, or the European rule, wherelll prevailing litigant IS reim­
bursed by the loser for at least part of his attorneys fees routinely. See note 11 
mfra. 
2. In addition to thiS statutory exception to the Amencan rule, fees are allowed, 
III Amencan federal courts, where provided by contract; III diversity cases where 
proVided In applicable state statutes or practices; or under three equitable excep­
tions. The first of these IS the common fund theory, where named plaintiff causes 
the creation of fund which will be shared by persons not party to the litigation, and 
the litigant' fees are paid out of the fund In order to prevent the unjust ennchment 
of the nonparties. See, e.g., Sprague Ticomc Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trus­
tees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). A second equitable exception IS the bad 
faith, or obdurate obstinacy rationale-the punitive assessment of fees against 
partv who either bnngs or defends suit In bad faith, or engages In bad faith dunng 
the course of litigation. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Atkmson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). The third 
equitable exception to the Amencan rule IS the common benefit theory, which al­
lows fee shifting when litigant produces generally nonmonetary benefit shared 
by nonparties, and the assessment of fees agaillst the defendant will serve to spread 
the cost evenly among the beneficlanes. See, e.g., Hall Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); 
Mills Electnc Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
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of pnvate attorney general, 3 or citizen who sued to vmdicat[ e] a 
policy that Congress consIdered of the hIghest pnority"4 and a 
proliferatIon of statutes authonzmg awards of attorneys fees to 
such litigants. 5 
For a tIme, the courts seemed to be full partners m the exten­
SIOn of the pnvate attorney general theory and Congress adoptIon 
of new statutes authonzmg fees was matched by court declSlons 
mvokmg equity powers to award pnvate attorney general fees m 
areas not specifically dealt with by Congress. 6 ThIS partnershIp was 
3. The tenn prIvate attorney general" was first used by Judge Jerome Frank, 
to describe one who brIngs prIvate enforcement suit. ASSOCiated Indus., Inc. v. 
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 
4. Newman Piggle Park EnterprIses, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968). 
5. The number of such fee-authorIzmg statutes has almost doubled smce 1960. 
Most fee statutes passed smce 1960 have mvolved the broad areas of discrImmation 
based on age, race, sex, handicap or other suspect classification, civil rIghts, and con­
sumer and environmental protection. E.g., the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); the PrIvacy Act of 1974, Id. § 552a(g)(3)(B); the Hart-Scott­
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c(a)(2), 15c(d)(2), 26 
(1976); the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Id. § 1400(b); the 
Truth m Lending Act, Id., § 1640(a); the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Id. § 1681n; the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Id. § 1691e(d); the Motor Vehicle Information and 
Cost Savmgs Act, Id. §§ 1918(a), 1989(a); the Consumer Product Safety Act, Id. §§ 
2059(e)(4), 2060(c), 2072(a), 2073; the TOXIC Substances Control Act, Id. § 2619(c)(2); 
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); the Age DiscrImmation 
m Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-624 (1976); the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); the State and Local Fiscal As­
sistance Amendments of 1976, 31 U.S.C. § 1244(e) (1976); the Federal Water Pollu­
tion Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(d), 1367(c) (1976); the Ocean Dumpmg Act, Id. § 
1415(g)(4); the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Id. § 1515(d); the Safe DrInkmg Water 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (1976); the Clean Air Act, Id. § 1857h-2(d); the Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1975; Id. § 1973l.(e); fee provlSlons m Titles II and VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Id. §§ 2000a-3(b), e-5(k); Title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, Id. § 3612(c); the Omnibus CrIme Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
[d. § 3766(c)(4)(B); the NOise Control Act of 1972, Id. § 4911(d); and the Age Dis­
crImmation Act of 1975,42 U.S.C.A. § 6104(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
6. Most nonstatutory pnvate attorney general" fee awards were made m cases 
brought under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 (1976), 
and mvolved Issues rangmg from discnmmation m schools, housmg, Jobs and Junes 
to first and fourth amendment vIOlations, police harassment, and redistricting. See 
generally M. DERFNER, ATTORNEYS FEES IN PRO BONO PUBLICO CASES: A COMPI­
LATION OF FEDERAL COURT CASES (1972) (Lawvers Comm. for Civil Rights, Wash., 
D.C.), repnnted In Heanngs on the Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Repre­
sentation Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 862, at 888-1025 (1973). By the time of 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv Co. Wilderness Soc 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the prIvate at­
torney general theory was also bemg applied to cases mvolvmg, Inter alia, umon de­
mocracy and falr representatIOn and consumer and environmental protection. E.g., 
M. DERFNER, ATTORNEYS FEES IN PRO BONO PUBLICO CASES: A COMPILATION OF 
FEDERAL COURT CASES (1972) (Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights, Wash., D.C.), re­
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dissolved III 1975, when the United States Supreme Court ruled III 
Alyeska Pipeline Servtce Co. v. Wilderness SOCtety7 that federal 
courts had no equity power to award fees,8 and that it was up to 
Congress, not the courts, to specify whICh congresslOnal poliCIes 
should be promoted by fee awards. 9 
pnnted In Heanngs on the Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation 
Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 862, at 1060-62, 1067-107 (1973). Alyeska itself 
was an envlTonmental case In whICh the court below had awarded non-statutory pn­
vate attorney general fees. 
7 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
8. The Court In Alyeska held that, 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1976), costs statute baSI­
cally unchanged smce 1853, depnves federal courts of any equitable power to award 
fees, notwithstanding an unbroken line of cases smce 1882 whICh had held that 
courts could exercise such power where necessary to do Justice. 421 U.S. at 257. 
In 1939, the Supreme Court held: 

Allowance of [attorneys fees] m appropnate situations IS part of the hlstonc 

equity Junsdiction of the federal courts. Plamly the foundation for the hls­

tonc practice of granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than 

the conventional [statutory] taxable costs IS part of the ongmal authority of 

the chancellor to do equity m particular situation. 

Sprague v. Ticonlc Nat'! Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164, 166 (1939) (Frankfuter, J.). In 1973, 
the Supreme Court held: 
Although the traditional Amencan rule ordinarily disfavors the allow­
ance of attorneys fees In the absence of statutory or contractual authonza­
tion, federal courts, m the exercise of their equitable powers, may award at­
torneys fees when the mterests of Justice so reqUire. [F]ederal courts do 
nut hesitate to exercise thiS mherent equitable power whenever overnding 
considerations mdicate the need for such recovery 
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1,4-5 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (quoting Mills v. ElectriC Auto-Lite 
Co., 396 U.S. 375,391-92 (1970)) (footnotes omitted). In Alyeska, the Supreme Court 
held: "Congress has not extended any roving authority to the JudiCiary to allow 
counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them war­
ranted. 421 U.S. at 260 (White, J.). 
The Alyeska Court did not even attempt to explam why thiS statutory bar should 
apply to the pnvate attorney general theory and not to the common fund, common 
benefit and bad faith theones which it reaffirmed. See note 2 supra. Mr. Justice 
Marshall, dissenting, concluded "that the Court IS willing to tolerate the equitable 
exceptions to its analYSIS, not because they can be squared with it, but because they 
are by now too well established to be casually dispensed with. 421 U.S. at 278. 
9. [C]ongresslOnal utilization of the pnvate-attorney-general concept can m 
no sense be construed as grant of authoritv to the Judiciary to Jettison the 
traditional rule against nonstatutory allowances to the prevailing party and to 
award attorneys fees whenever the courts deem the public policy furthered 
by particular statute Important enough to warrant the award. 
Congress Itself presumably has the power and Judgment to pick and choose 
among its statutes and to allow attorneys fees under some, but not others. 
But it would be difficult, mdeed, for the courts, without legislative gUid­
ance, to conSider some statutes Important and others unimportant and to al­
low attorneys fees only m connection with the former. 
421 U.S. at 263-64. 
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The mcreasmg Importance of attorneys fees for public Illterest 
litigants, and the Supreme Court's curbmg of the courts ability to 
fill out congressIOnal policy have made the literal language of at­
torneys fees statutes worthy of critical study and have hIghlighted 
the need for a careful analytical look at the different types of prOVI­
SIons whIch may be used to effectuate certaIn legIslative goals. 
In the follOWIng analYSIS, whICh deals with some of the draftmg 
categorIes III whICh fee statutes may fall, it IS Important to remem­
ber that a provlSlon for attorneys fees IS desIgned to affect the pol­
ICy balance, and that fee prOVlSlons will mevitably stimulate or re­
tard certam goals and poliCIes, gIvmg an advantage, m varymg 
degrees, to one mterest or another There IS no such thmg as a 
neutral attorneys fees policy or statute. 10 How the balance IS af­
fected, and to what degree, depends on the specific form of the fee 
prOVISIOn. ThIS article evaluates how draftIng affects legIslative pol­
ICy III two areas: The breadth of statutory coverage and the 
standards for receIpt of fees, mcluding how reCIpIent eligibility IS 
determmed and how readily fees are awarded. 
I. THE BREADTH OF COVERAGE 
There are three general categorIes of fee legIslation: Omnibus, 
specific, and generIc. A prOVlSlon whICh authOrIzes fee shiftmg m 
any CIvil litigation, whether the mterests promoted are public or 
purely prIvate, IS an omnibus provlSlon;l1 one whICh authOrIzes fee 
awards under a smgle statute, or a smgle section of a smgle statute, 
IS specific; 12 and one whICh authOrIzes fees for cases whICh fall mto 
a specifiable category IS generIc. 13 
10. While it mIght be argued that the English Rule, where fees are automatic 
ally shifted to the lOSIng litigant upon completion of case, IS neutral, such system 
favors the wealthIer litigant In pnvate litigation, and the defendant In public Interest 
litigation. See notes 16-23 mfra and accompanYing text. 
11. ThIS IS the English rule, whICh prevails almost umversaIly The English 
system IS described at length In Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929). In 
England itself, the fee award IS discretionary but the usual practice IS to allow it, 
and the amounts awarded foHow ngld schedule of maxImum perrmssible fees for 
each task within each court level. The English system has been adopted, with but 
few modificatIOns, In other nations within the British Commonwealth, such as 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Williams, Fee Shifting and Public Interest Liti­
gation, 64 A.B.A.J. 859 (1978). The system has been altered and adapted In other 
countnes and vanes WIdely from place to place. See ABA INT'L & COMPARATIVE 
LAW SECTION PROCEEDINGS-REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPARATIVE PRO­
CEDURE & PRACTICE (1962). 
The United States, of course, has no omnibus fee proVISIOn. 
12. The vast majority of Amencan fee shifting proVISIOns fall under thIS cate­
gory 
13. The United States Code currently contains but handful of genenc proVI­
sIOns. See notes 56-58 mfra and accompanying text. 
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A. Omnibus Fee Legzslatwn 
AdoptIon of an omnibus attorneys fees provlSlon would either 
reverse or substantIally modify the Amencan Rule," depending 
upon whether the prOVlSlon mandated fee shiftmg or merely au­
thorIzed it. Either approach-adoptIon of the English system of 
umversal mdemnity or authonzatIon of fee shiftmg "in the mterests 
of JustIce, or under SImilar standards-poses dangers for the pub­
lic mterest litIgant, especIally when applied to purely prIvate cases. 
l. Umversal Indemnity 
The benefits and drawbacks of the traditIonal AmerIcan rule as 
applied to prIvate litigatIOn have been hotly contested m recent 
years. 14 Proponents of the rule argue that a change would deter lit­
Igation by creatmg a likelihood that litigants would be forced to pay 
double costs. Opponents of the rule argue that a party who wms a 
lawsuit IS not made whole if he must pay an attorney s fee out of 
hIS own pocket. Since the country has had no experIence with m­
demnity m purely pnvate litIgatIon,15 no one really knows what ef­
14. See, e.g., Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed? CALIF ST. B.J., March, 
1938 at 42; Ehrenzwelg, ReImbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great SocIety, 54 
CALIF L. REV 792 (1966); Ehrenzwelg, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed? 26 CALIF 
ST. B.J. 107 (1951); Greenberger, The Cost of Justtce: An Amencan Problem, An 
English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REV 400 (1964); Kuenzel, The Attorney Fee: Why Not 
Cost of Litigation? 49 IOWA L. REV 75 (1963); Mause, Winner Takes All: A 
Reexammation of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV 26 (1969); McCormick, 
Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 
MINN. L. REV 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney Fees: A New 
Method of Financmg Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV 761 (1972); Stoebuck, 
Counsel Fees Included m Costs: A LogIcal Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV 202 
(1966); Note, Attorney Fees as an Element of Damages, 15 U. CIN. L. REv 313 
(1941); Note, Attorney Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L. 
REV 1216 (1967); Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L. 
J. 699 (1940); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney Fees and Equal Access to the 
Courts, 122 U PA. L. REV 636 (1974). In fact, both Sides of the controversy often of­
fer their theory as the remedy for the same problem. For mstance, the supporters of 
the Amencan rule argue that it allows the poorer citizen to press hiS claims m court 
without the fear that he will be forced to pay both hiS own and hiS opponent' law­
yer; supporters of the English rule, on the other hand, argue that poor citizen will 
be more, not less, likely to sue under system of umversal mdemnity if convmced 
the often prohibitive expenses of litigation would be borne by hiS opponent. Propo­
nents of the Amencan rule argue that, if thiS IS true, adoption of umversal mdemnity 
would mcrease court congestion by encouragmg recourse to the courts and the msti­
tution of more small claims; opponents argue that adoption of umversal mdemnity 
would clear the courts by encouragmg out of court settlement. 
15. The traditional Amencan rule, as applied to purely pnvate cases, has 
great weight of history behmd it, no matter how slim the mitial Justification. The 
statutes whICh Congress has passed abrogating the rule have, by and large, con­
cerned litigation m the public mterest, and even those fee prOVISIOnS, such as the 
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fect umversal mdemnity would have on such litIgatIon. 16 What ef­
fect adoptIon of unIversal Indemnity would have on the prIvate at­
torney general, however IS clear He would become one of our 
most endangered speCIes. 
Public Interest litIgatIon IS always uncertaIn at best. The past 
decade has seen the erection of a multitude of procedural and JU­
rIsdictIOnal barriers: lffim unities have appeared out of nowhere,17 
Injured parties have been told they lack standing to complaIn about 
the acts that Injured them,18 and litIgants have found themselves 
Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2565 (1976), the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 
U.S.C. § 1117 (1976) and the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976), whICh arguably au­
thonze fees for private cases, do so for type of private litigation whICh also affects 
the public. And even then, those statutes typIcally adopt standards whICh permit the 
award In only narrow range of cases, generally "in exceptional cases. 
The bad faith exception, one of the equitable exceptions to the American rule, 
permits fee awards In private litigation, thereby promoting the public Interest In 
fair system of Justice. It can therefore be saId to be public Interest exception even 
when applied In pnvate litigation. The other equitable exception whICh permits an 
award of fees In private cases, the common fund/common benefit exception, shifts 
the fees not to the opposing litigant, but to all benefiCIaries of the litigation, and IS 
therefore Inapposite. 
16. In England, there IS much less litigation than there IS In the United States. 
ThIS fact has led many commentators to believe that unIversal Indemnity would In­
crease the Instances of out of court settlement and decrease litigation, thereby acting 
as solution to court congestion. See, e.g., Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 862-72 
(1929); Kuenzel, The Attorney Fee: Why Not Cost of Litigatton? 49 IOWA L. REV 
75, 80 (1963). What IS unfortunate IS that adoption of the English rule, if it would de­
crease litigation here, would doubtless deter the less wealthy litigant more than the 
wealthy one. See generally Mause, Winner Takes All: A Reexamination of the In­
demnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV 26 (1969) (examines the English rule under 
mathematical formula and draws from psychology In an attempt to discover what ef­
fect Indemnity would have on private litigation In thIS country). 
Under the American rule, it IS saId that poor plaIntiffs In private cases are kept 
out of court because they cannot afford lawyer to represent them. But thIS IS rarely 
true In private federal litigation, where the umque American contingent fee system 
permits the litigant to hIre an attorney. Here, the plaIntiff risks costs and expenses, 
and the attorney risks uncompensated hours; neither IS SIgnificantly out of pocket if 
the suit IS unsuccessful. Under the English system, however, the poor plaIntiff, 
should he lose, owes both hIS own attorney and that of hIS opponent. Unless plaIn­
tiff IS Judgment proof, he IS gOing to thInk tWIce before filing even the most meritori­
ous case. 
The most frequently cited example of the unfaIrness of the American rule IS the 
small claIm whose value IS exceeded by the lawyer fee. If an Injured party IS not 
wealthy, the chances of hIS riskIng more than tWIce the potential damages to recover 
are slim mdeed, even with an all but aIrtight case. 
17. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Pierson Ray, 386 U.S. 
547 (1967). 
18. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 426 U.S. 26 
(1976). 
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frustrated by bIzarre exhaustIon and abstentIon rules. 19 Simply 
gammg a Judge s ear IS hard enough, but then one must prove 
one s case, and IS now often reqUIred to prove an mtent on the 
part of the defendants to disobey the law 20 The rules of the game 
can, and often do, change m midcase. 
As public mterest law becomes more sophIstIcated and more 
complicated, the tIme and expense mvolved mcreases. The oppo­
nent m public mterest litIgatIOn IS more often than not either a 
public body or a corporatIOn, with resources to litIgate every pomt 
to the hilt, mcluding multIple appeals and remands. 
A purely pnvate case IS less uncertam, less complicated and 
less expenSIve than a public mterest case. Furthermore, pnvate lit­
IgatIon often produces a monetary recovery for the plamtiff whICh 
Justifies the nsk mherent m litIgatIon. If umversal mdemnity deters 
the less wealthy litIgant m a purely pnvate case, the deterrent ef­
fect of umversal mdemnity on a pnvate attorney general must be 
staggermg. 
In England, Canada, and the other Commonwealth natIons, 
there are very few pnvate attorneys general. 21 While rules whICh 
limit standing may partIally explam thIs,22 it IS logIcal to as­
sume that unIversal mdemnity IS also largely to blame. 23 There IS 
no country whIch adopts umversal mdemnity and has laws treatmg 
19. See, e.g., Stone Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Hicks Miranda, 422 U.S. 
332 (1975). 
20. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979); Washmgton v DaVIS, 
426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
21. Williams, Fee Shifting and Public Interest Litigation, 64 A.B.A.J. 859, 862 
(1978). 
22. Id. 
23. Law refonn bodies m Australia and Canada have acknowledged that 
costs mdemnity effectively bars the pnvate enforcer from access to the 
courts, and they recognize the merits of the Amencan costs practice m thiS 
type of litigation. 
That Australia and Canada, whICh traditionally have applied fee shifting 
m all cases, should now be ready to abandon the pnnclple m public mterest 
suits m order to make the proceeding Viable IS mstructive. Expenence m 
these countries mdicates that the mtroduction of fee shifting m the United 
States could well end the role of the pnvate enforcer m litigation of thiS 
kmd. Fee shifting undoubtedly would help compensate the successful party, 
but what its advocates fail to acknowledge IS that for the government, corpo­
ration, or mdivldual charged with breach of the public mterest, the benefit 
would be much more Significant. The threat of litigation would all but disap­
pear. 
Id. 
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a public mterest litIgant and a pnvate litIgant differently when it 
comes to fee shiftmg. The Amencan Rule, however, has per 
mitted the United States to engage its pnvate citIzens m helpmg to 
enforce its laws by passmg fee prOVISIons whICh typIcally protect 
the pnvate attorney general from assessment of hIs opponent's 
counsel fees should he lose, and encourage hIm to sue by makmg 
fee awards almost automatIc should he wm. 
It IS not a mere comcIdence that public mterest litIgatIon, the 
contmgent fee, and the Amencan rule are all UnIque to the United 
States. AdoptIon of unIversal mdemnity would obvIously dispose of 
the contmgent fee. The possibility that it would also dispatch the 
pnvate attorney general should make legIslators and public mterest 
groups extremely wary 
2. Modified Indemnity 
Several attempts have been made m recent years to authonze 
fee shiftmg m any CIvil case when a fee award would serve the "in­
terests of JustIce."24 While thIS approach seems, on its face, more 
equitable and less nsky for the pnvate attorney general, it shares 
many of the drawbacks of unIversal mdemnity because it covers 
both public mterest and pnvate actIons. 25 
The differences between public mterest cases and pnvate 
cases are SImply too great to encompass withm the language of a 
smgle, general fee statute. The largest difference between pnvate 
and public mterest cases IS that pnvate cases generally reflect no 
specific policy no goal to be favored, no claIm or defense to be en­
couraged or discouraged. In short, they reflect a preference for 
stnct neutrality and a focus purely on the mdivIdual case. Con­
versely public mterest cases anse under specific statutes enacted 
to achIeve certam legIslatIve goals. Clearly the "interests of JUS­
24. E.g., H.R. 7826 & 8221, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (sponsored by Rep. 
John F Seiberling, Democrat of the 14th CongressIOnal distnct of OhIO). The Bill 
was Introduced less than month after Alyeska. "If In Civil action the court deter­
mmes the Interests of Justice so reqUire, the court shall award reasonable attorneys 
fees to the prevailing party. The United States shall be liable for such fees the same 
as pnvate party. ld. When the 94th Congress failed to act on thiS measure, Rep. 
Seiberling reIntroduced the bill to the next Congress. H.R. lOlO5, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1977). 
25. Even if thiS type of language IS, through legislative history or otherwise, 
seen as restoration of the pnvate attorney general" rationale, authonzIng fees only 
m public mterest litigation, it IS an Inadequate answer to the problem of encouragmg 
pnvate citizens to sue m the public Interest. See notes 61-64 mfra and accompanymg 
text. 
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tIce" standard could not have the same meanmg m purely pnvate 
cases, where neutrality IS necessary and m public mterest cases, 
where equity favors the sIde seekmg to assert and vmdicate con­
gresslOnal policy Would fees be awarded as a matter of course, or 
only rarely? Should a court treat plamtiffs and defendants equally 
or favor one SIde or the other? The answers are, of course, differ 
ent for pnvate and public mterest cases, and even for different 
types of public mterest cases, yet any attempt to develop different 
standards from Identical language would be apt to create dangerous 
confuslOn withm the courts. ThIS confuslOn would be mtensified by 
the difficulty whlCh often anses m definmg the diVIding line be­
tween pnvate cases and public mterest cases, especIally m those 
many cases whlCh have both pnvate and public elements. 
B. Specific Fee Legzslatwn 
By far the greatest number of federal fee prOVlSlons are spe­
cific; that IS, they authonze fees for suits under only particular stat­
utes, or particular sections of those statutes. 26 Such prOVlSlons are 
clearly adjuncts to specific legIslative poliCIes, and as such are gen­
erally attached only to those statutes whlCh Congress deems of the 
utmost Importance. 27 
The greatest benefit of the specific statute IS that it can be 
tailored to the particular situation with great preclSlon. 28 Leglsla­
26. Some of these proVISIOns authonze fee shifting under an entire chapter of 
the United States Code, e.g., Wire Interception Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976); some 
for suits under subchapter of the Code, e.g., Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2565 (1976); Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976); 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; ld. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); CommunIcations Act 
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1976); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1976), some 
for suits under section of the Code, e.g., Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 
(1976); State and Local Fiscal ASSistance Amendments of 1976, 31 U.S.C. § 1244(e) 
(1976); Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); and 
some for subsection, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2059(e)(4) (1976), 
TOXIC Substances Control Act, Id. § 2619(c)(2); or paragraph of subsection, e.g., 
Freedom of Infonnation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(E) (1976); Pnvacy Act, [d. § 
552a(g)(3)(B); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 
1400(b) (1976). 
27. One can, m fact, get an mteresting view of Amencan history smce the Re­
construction by ascertainIng whICh statutes contamed fee shifting proVISIOns. For ex­
ample, our first fee shifting measures were contained m the Enforcement Act of 
1870, Ch. 114, § 12, 16 Stat. 140, whICh prohibited certam acts of raCial discrImma­
tion m voting. Similarly, m the decade followmg the Crash of 1929, fee provISIons 
were mcluded m, mter alia, the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976); the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Id. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a); the Trust Indenture Act, Id. §§ 
77ooo(e), 77www(a); the Noms-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1976); the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, Id. § 216(b). 
28. For example, the Noms-Laguardia Act fee prOVISIon, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) 
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tors at least must face questIons of how the prOVlSlon should be 
drafted to promote the goals of one very explicit, limited citIzen 
suit provIsIOn. Greater care can be taken to answer those questIons 
than IS possible with a broader fee prOVlSlon. ConfusIOn m the 
courts IS also aVOIded. The courts, at least after Alyeska, know 
whether they can or must award fees m a gIVen case depending 
upon whether the suit IS brought under a statute whICh au­
thonzes fee shiftmg. 29 As the legIslatIve hIstory of specific fee pro­
VISIons IS becommg more and more detailed,30 Judges discretIon IS 
becommg correspondingly cIrcumscribed, and declSlons more um­
form. 
On the other hand, m light of Congress mcreasmg reliance 
upon pnvate citIzens to enforce the laws whIch it passes, and the 
Supreme Court's mSIstence that fees be awarded only when Con­
gress has specifically so authonzed, thIS approach seems both tIme­
consummg and mefficient. In order for congressIOnal response to 
Alyeska to be complete, it would be necessary under the specific 
approach, to Isolate every law Congress has ever passed; to decIde 
whICh of these laws contam a congressIonal policy Important 
enough to merit fee shiftmg (or whICh sectIons of a law do and 
(1976), authonzes fees to successful defendants alone, because under that Act it IS 
the defendants rather than the plamtiffs who assert the federal nght. LikeWise, under 
the Trademark Act fee proVIsion, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976), fees are allowed "in ex­
ceptional cases, and to plamtiffs and defendants equally, because the rIght bemg as­
serted or protected IS baSically prIvate one. 
29. Under the nonstatutory prIvate attorney general rationale, the Judges dis­
cretion was necessarily extremely broad, and different Junsdictions frequently came 
to different conclUSIOns about virtually Identical cases. Compare Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973), with Natural Resources 
Defense Counsel, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The broader the cov­
erage of the fee prOVISion, the broader the Judges discretion, so that thiS situation 
might well repeat itself under both an omnibus prOVISIOn and an extremely broad ge­
nenc provIsion. See notes 61-64 Infra and accompanymg text. 
30. By comparison to the public mterest fee prOVISIOns of the 1960's, whICh 
were accompamed by little or no legislative gUidance, those of the 1970' have been 
accompamed by mcreasmgly comprehenSive legislative history. See, e.g., Clean Air 
Act, S. REP No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 483 (1970); Voting Rights Act Amend­
ments of 1975, H.R. REP No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1975), S. REP No. 295, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-43 (1975), reprinted In [1975] 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 774, 121 CONGo REC. 16244-46 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Don Edwards), and 121 
CONGo REC. 16268-70 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Robert Drman); TOXIC Substances 
Control Act, 122 CONGo REC. 8286-87 (1976) (remarks of Sen. John Tunney); Civil 
Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AWARDS ACT OF 1976 SOURCE BOOK. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER 
DOCUMENTS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
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whICh do not con tam such Important policIes); and then, to draft 
language amending the laws, one by one. Also, care would have to 
be taken to mclude fee prOVISIons m all future statutes whICh m­
volve strong congressIOnal policIes. The legIslatIve process sImply 
does not lend itself to thIS,31 and thus, the limitatIons of the spe­
cific approach would remam if Congress were to contmue to rely 
upon it almost solely 
The specific approach IS limited mamly because it carves out a 
partIcular portIon of an area of the law and deals with it without SI­
multaneously dealing with related areas of the law 32 sometImes 
even m other portIons of the same statute. 33 So long as the federal 
courts were able to fill m the mterstIces, grantmg fees m cases 
whICh promoted strong congreSSIOnal policIes but were brought un­
der laws for whICh fees were not specifically authorIzed, then a de­
gree of consIstency was achleved. 34 Now that the courts have been 
31. Representative John Sieberling, testifYing on number of attorneys fee 
bills, hIghlighted problems of both Inattention and politics whICh create difficulties 
when the specific approach IS used: 
[W]e can often have an anomalous situation on particular bill, for example, 
the Federal InsectiCIde, FungIcIde, and RodentiCIde Act, whICh IS now In 
the process of being worked through the floor of the House. I expect to offer 
an amendment to that act to authonze the awarding of attorneys fees, and 
yet it IS possible that the House will reject that-you never know from one 
bill to the next how the mood IS gOing to be. We could end up with pecu­
liar situation where some statutes have such provISIon, and others do not. 
Heanngs on Awarding of Attorneys Fees before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties & the Admmlstration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judicwry, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1975) (testimony of Rep. John Seiberling). 
32. Attorney fee proVISIons are Included In great number of envuonmental 
statutes, e.g., the TOXIC Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2) (1976), the 
Water Pollution Prevention & Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976); the Ocean 
Dumping Act, Id. § 1415(g)(4); the Safe DnnkIng Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 30Oj-8(d) 
(1976), the Clean Au Act, Id. § 1857h-2(d), the NOIse Control Act, Id. § 49U(d), and 
yet they are not Included In, mter alia, the Federal InsecticIde, FungIcIde, and 
RodenticIde Act, 7 U.S.C. § 131(d) (1976), although thIS Act has been amended or 
supplemented four times Since Representative Seiberling comments. See note 31 
supra. 
33. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 containS two citizen suit proVI­
sIOns. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1976). Fees are available under the latter, but not the 
former. Similarly pnor to passage of the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 
1976, fees were allowed under Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but 
not under Title VI of the same Act. And, pnor to passage of 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), 
section of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, fees were al­
lowed In antitrust actions where treble damages were recovered, but not In antitrust 
actions resulting In only Injunctive relief. 
34. Pnor to passage of the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), hOUSing discnmInation statute passed dunng Reconstruction, 
did not proVIde for attorneys fees, but the Fau HOUSing Act of 1968, whICh pro­
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stnpped of the power to act mterstitIally the specific approach m­
evitably mcludes certam types of cases while excluding others that 
mvolve the same congressIOnal policIes. 
The only solution under the specific approach IS to pass more 
fee authonzmg statutes. That course presents problems whIch have 
become eVIdent m the past few years as the number of fee prOVI­
SIons proposed and enacted has mcreased dramatically 35 The sheer 
number of fee bills proposed under the specific approach poses the 
tWIn dangers that legIslators will tire of them qUIckly and stop 
passmg them, or at the opposite extreme, they will become a tradi­
tional part of the apparatus and will not be scrutInIzed closely 
enough. 36 
Should Congress contmue to rely solely upon specific fee leg­
Islation, perhaps a modification by whIch fees are authonzed, when 
appropnate, under all citizen suit prOVIsIOns of a particular statute, 
rather than section by section, would be more sensible. More SIg­
nificant modificatIons are needed, however, if the concept of attor 
neys fees as a means of promotmg legIslative policy IS to have ade­
quate force m the 1980's and beyond. 
C. Genenc Fee Leglslatwn 
The genenc, or categoncal, attorneys fees prOVISIon IS mIdway 
between the omnibus and specific statute. Under the genenc ap­
proach, Congress selects an area of the law m whIch it determmes 
that fees are essential, and authonzes fees m that area, rather than 
statute by statute. 37 Even before Alyeska, Congress passed several 
tected the same nghts, did. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). The nonstatutory pnvate at­
torney general rationale permitted the courts to award fees under the former, older 
law. See, e.g., Lee Southern Home-Sites, Inc., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). Simi­
larly, pnor to Alyeska, many courts used theIr equity powers to award fees m cases 
under sections of statutes whICh were silent as to fees where other sections of the 
same statute proVided for fees. See, e.g., Hall V Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Natural Re­
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973). 
35. See note 5 supra. The 95th Congress alone authonzed fees under one or 
more sections of 17 different acts. [d. 
36. From the pomt of view of those who have been most mterested m fee leg­
Islation, such as pro-civil nghts, pro-consumer, pro-environment public mterest advo­
cates, the Widespread recognition of how Important fees are has negative Side: the 
prospect that their opponents will succeed m usmg fee legislation to promote anti­
Civil nghts, anti-enVironmental, or pro-big busmess poliCies. Some of the recent bills 
authonzmg fees agamst the United States, two of whICh have, mcredibly, passed the 
Senate, have made thiS prospect quite real. See notes 58 & 95 mfra. A great number 
of Senators are now obVIOusly used to the Idea of attorneys fees as bemg m 
the public mterest, and have ceased to examme them m any but cursory fashIOn. 
37. Congress had earlier passed several genenc proVISIOns m commercial areas. 
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genenc provlSlons m public mterest areas, m an attempt to aVOId 
the straitjacket of specific statutes. 38 
The genenc approach can encompass prOVISIons of varymg 
scope and breadth. Under the genenc approach, Congress mIght 
authonze fee shiftmg m cases that vIndicate a congressIOnal policy 
as reflected In federal statutes, on (broadly) enVIronmental protec­
tIon, or (narrowly) aIr pollutIOn, whether suit IS brought under the 
Clean AIr Act39 or sectIOn 1983,40 mter alia. Also, fees mIght be 
authonzed when a pnvate suit vmdicates statutory policIes on 
(broadly) consumer protectIOn or (narrowly) faIr lending practIces. 
In additIon, the genenc approach can, as m the Civil Rights Attor 
ney s Fees Awards Act of 197641 or the Truth m Lending Act fee 
proVIsIon,42 merely lump together vanous statutes whICh mvolve 
SImilar nghts, and authonze fees under those statutes, m whICh 
case the breadth of the measure depends upon the breadth of the 
statutes listed. 
Our narrowest genenc public mterest fee statute IS the fee 
prOVISIon m the Truth In Lending Act,43 mitIally a specific prOVI­
SIOn authonzmg fees for proof of VIOlatIons of the Act's disclosure 
prOVISIOns. In 1974, the prOVISIon was amended to cover suits 
brought under the FaIr Credit Billing Act,44 and m 1976, it was 
agaIn amended to cover suits brought under the Consumer Leasmg 
Act45 as well. ThIS provlSlon IS narrow both because it merely lists 
specific statutes, makmg it, m essence, the eqUIvalent of three spe­
cific prOVISIons, and because the statutes whICh it covers are pre-
The Copynght Act fee prOVlSlon, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976), baSically unchanged Since 
1909, allows fees in any suit under title 17 of the United States Code; that IS, any 
copynght case. The fee provISIon in t1ie Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976), allows 
fees "in exceptional cases, without limiting itself to any particular category of 
patent case. The Clayton Act fee proVIsion, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), IS also genenc, 
mandating fees to anyone Injured by VIOlation of t1ie antitrust laws. 
38. Section 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U .S.C. § 1617 (1976), 
was passed several years before the Alyeska deCISIOn. Section 408(a) of the FaIr 
Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 301-06, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974), whICh 
amended the Truth In Lending Act fee prOVISIon, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976), and 
made it genenc, was passed seven months pnor to Alyeska. Section 402 of the 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976), was proposed 
before, but passed after Alyeska. 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1976). 
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1979). 
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1988 (1976). 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976). 
43. ld. 
44. Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 301-06,88 Stat. 1500 (1974). 
45. Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (1976). 
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Clse and limited m theIr coverage. It IS generIC, nonetheless. Con­
gress chose faIr lending practIces as an area for whICh fees were 
approprIate, and proceeded to authorIze them m relevant statutes. 
Another generIC fee prOVISIon whICh lists a number of statutes 
m a gIVen area IS the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 
1976.46 Here, Congress chose CIVil rIghts as an area for whIch fees 
were essentIal, and authorIzed them m cases under SIX CIvil rIghts 
provlslons. 47 Unlike the Truth m Lending Act,48 however, the 
1976 Act IS the broadest fee statute to date because of the breadth 
of one of the statutes covered, sectIon 1983.49 
Two additIonal public mterest generIC fee prOVISIons, sectIon 
402 of the Votmg Rights Act Amendments of 197550 and sectIon 
718 of the EducatIon Amendments of 1972,51 are drafted differ 
ently Although these prOVISIons are less broad than the Civil 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1988 (1976). 
47. The provISIons for which fees are authonzed under the Civil Rights Attor­
ney Fees Awards Act of 1976 are: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 
2000d-h (1976) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), and 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 
(1976) (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). The Act also allows fee 
shifting In an extremely limited number of suits InvolvIng the Internal Revenue 
Service. See notes 105-124 mfra and accompanyIng text. 
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976). 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). ThiS section provides cause of action for VIOla­
tions of federal constitutional and statutory nghts by state or local offiCials. It was, 
and still IS, the workhorse of Civil nghts law In that § 1983 allows suits for JUry dis­
cnmInation, school desegregation, VIOlations of voting nghts, misuse of federal funds, 
VIOlation of first and fourth amendment nghts, demal of due process or equal protec­
tion, police misconduct, and even some consumer and envIronmental Issues. Section 
1983 IS, In fact, so broad that it covers majority of the cases covered by the genenc 
fee provISIons In both the Education Amendments and the Voting Rights Act Amend­
ments. 
An Admmlstration spokesperson, testifYIng at hearmgs on the Civil Rights Attor­
ney Fees Awards Act and other fee bills, best summed up the breadth of § 1983 
and the consequent breadth of the Attorney Fees Act: 
[Section] 1983 IS by its nature so broad, that thiS would be tantamount to 
virtually saYIng In all Civil nghts actions attorneys fees would be awarded. 
The language of 1983, applies to any nghts, prIvileges, or Immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws. 1983 IS not even limited to the 
Constitution: it also applies to nghts secured by the laws of the United 
States. It would be general pnvate attorney general piece of legislation if 
it were enacted. 
Heanngs on Awarding of Attorneys Fees before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties & the Adm,mstration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judic,ary, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1975) (testimony of Hon. Rex E. Lee). 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (1976). 
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). 
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Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976,52 they are broader than 
the Truth m Lending Act. 53 The Voting Rights Act fee prOVlSlon 
authonzes fees for proof of vIOlatIons of the votmg guarantees of 
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments; the EducatIon Amend­
ments fee prOVlSlon authonzes fees for proof of racIal discnmmatIon 
m public elementary and secondary educatIon. Both of these prOVI­
SIons, unlike the Fees Awards and the Truth m Lending Acts, de­
fine theIr coverage m words rather than sectIons, and therefore, 
cover an area m blanket fashIOn, regardless of the statute under 
whICh suit IS brought. 54 The Votmg RIghts Act fee provlSlon IS less 
narrow than the EducatIon Amendments measure SImply because 
its definitIon of the area covered IS broader 55 
All genenc statutes passed to date have dealt with substantIve 
categones, but the genenc approach also mIght be used for proce­
dural categones of cases. For example, a statute mIght authonze 
the award of fees m certam types of admInIstratIve hearmgs,56 or m 
certam types of rulemakmg, ratemakmg, licensmg, or adjudicatory 
proceedings. 57 Also, a statute mIght authonze fee shiftmg when­
52. 42 U.S.C. H 1981, 1988 (1976). 
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976). 
54. One attendant benefit of thiS type of drafting IS that the proVISIOn covers 
not only current statutes whICh the drafters might have overlooked, but future stat­
utes m the area as well, so that it becomes difficult for case or class of cases to slip 
through the holes. 
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). Section 1617 could well have mcluded discnmma­
tion based on sex, handicap or age as well as race, and state mstitutions of higher ed­
ucation as well as elementary and secondary schools. 
56. Several pieces of specific legislation covermg admmlstrative heanngs have 
been passed m the last few years. Only one of those, however, section 122 of the 
Public Utility Regulatory PoliCies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.A. § 2632(a) (West Cum. 
Supp. 1979), IS truly fee shifting prOVISion, permitting the assessment of the fees of 
successful mtervenors m ratemakmg proceedings agamst the utility seekmg the rate 
mcrease. The other two fee provlSlons m the Federal Power Act, Id. § 825q-l(b)(2), 
and the Federal Trade CommiSSIOn Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(h)(l) (West 
Cum. Supp. 1979), allow federal agency to mdemnify mtervenors m adminIstrative 
heanngs out of funds appropnated for that purpose by the agency itself. 
57. It would be necessary to qualify such statutes, so that they resulted m pro­
mohon of the public, rather than pnvate, mterest. One way of accomplishmg thiS 
would be to combme the categoncal and procedural genenc approach and to author­
Ize fees when participation m heanngs has resulted m promotion of consumer or en­
vironmental mterests. Another way of qualifymg such procedural statute would be 
to allow fees to only those mtervenors who met certam critena, such as by requIrIng 
that an mtervenor have little or no finanCial mterest m the outcome of the hearmg 
or to reqUire that an mtervenor prove finanCial hardship before fees can be allowed. 
The first method, combmmg procedural and substantive categones, IS by far the best 
solution. It IS more effective way of ensurmg payment to mtervenors who promote 
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ever a pnvate citizen IS successful m havmg the United States or 
one of its officIals held m contempt. 58 
The merits and drawbacks of genenc fee legIslation vary ac­
cording to the breadth of the prOVlSlon. Any genenc measure 
aVOIds the major problems of the omnibus provlSlon by dealing 
with only one area of the law at a time, so that the congressIOnal 
poliCIes mvolved are basICally the same, and uncertamty and m­
conSIstency are dimIlllshed. 59 The genenc prOVISIon also deals con-
the public mterest (the assets of groups such as the Consumers Umon or the Sierra 
Club might preclude theu reimbursement under financial hardship test, even 
where they are acting as pnvate enforcers), while preventing the reimbursement of 
those parties who are promoting pnvate mterests (but who might meet some per­
sons definition of financial hardship, or whose financial mterest m the outcome 
might be remote, or difficult to establish). As difficult as it may be to define promo­
tion of consumer or environmental mterests, it IS probably safer and more equitable 
to define what must be promoted, rather than to attempt to define who must do the 
promoting. 
58. Since the Alyeska decIsIOn, several legislators have mtroduced bills whICh 
would authonze or mandate fees agamst the United States any time it lost Civil 
case. E.g., H.R. 4903, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Rep. Samuel Devme), mandating 
fees agamst the United States as either plamtiff or defendant any time it did not suc­
ceed; H.R. 913, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Rep. John Hammerschmidt), mandating 
fees agamst the United States as unsuccessful plamtiff only· S. 1001, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1977) (Sen. Pete Domemci), mandating fees agamst the United States as plam­
tiff or defendant when it loses case, mandating proportional fees agamst the United 
States as plamtiff or defendant when it partially loses, and authorIzmg fees agamst 
the United States as plamtiff or defendant when it wms; S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979) (Sen. Pete Domemci), mandating fees agamst the United States as plamtiff or 
defendant when it loses, unless it can show its position was substantially Justified. 
Both S. 1001 and S. 265 limited eligibility to mdivlduals with net worth of less 
than $1 million, and busmesses with net worth of less than $5 million. 
While these bills may seem generiC, they are actually omnibus, because they au­
thonze fee shifting m an almost limitless range of pnvate as well as public cases. 
Both S. 1001 and S. 265 were passed by the Senate. S. 1001 passed m late 1977 
as an amendment to the Legal Services Corporation Act, but was rejected as non­
germane by the House of Representatives m conference. S. REP No. 96-253, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979). S. 265 was recently passed by vote of 94 to 3 m the Sen­
ate, 125 CONGo REC. SlO,924 (daily ed. July 31, 1979), and was sent to the House, 
where its future IS uncertam. See note 95 Infra. 
59. The· Similarities withm eXisting fee provIsIOns m one area mdicate that 
Congress has normally adopted the same standards, and often the same statutory lan­
guage, for cases ansmg withm the same area. For example, most of the statutes 
authonzmg awards of attorneys fees m the environmental law field are the same: 
the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976), the 
Deepwater Ports Act, Id. § 1515(d), the Ocean Dumpmg Act, Id. § 1415(g)(4), and 
the NOise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1976), the Clean Au Act, ld. § 
1857h-2(d), the Safe Dnnkmg Water Act, ld. § 30Oj-8(d) all use Identical language. 
The same standards apply m most consumer protection fee proVIsIOns, e.g., Frur 
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(n) (1976), Truth m Lending Act, ld. § 
1640(a), and two provIsIOns of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savmgs Act, 
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sistently with more than one statute at a tIme, and therefore, ac­
complishes Congress goals more qUIckly and ratIonally than the 
specific approach. With the genenc fee prOVISIon, it IS also eaSIer 
to adapt rules of constructIon from one case to another than if 
there are different types of fee proVISIons for cases under different 
statutes. 60 
As with omnibus legIslatIon, the problems whIch accompany 
the broadest type of genenc fee prOVISIon revolve around difficul­
tIes m definitIon and conSIstency m applicatIon. Because a genenc 
prOVIsIOn does not cover both pnvate and public mterest cases, 
these problems are less severe for genenc than for omnibus mea­
sures, yet they still eXIst, and the broader the prOVISIon, the more 
severe the difficultIes. 
The broadest type of genenc fee prOVISIOn IS represented by a 
bill offered by RepresentatIve Robert Drman shortly after Alyeska 
was handed down, authonzmg fee shiftmg m suits under "any pro­
VISIOn of law whICh prOVIdes for the protectIon of CIvil or constitu­
tIonal nghts."61 The mtent of such a proVISIon IS to restore the pre­
Alyeska situatIon, and remstate the equity power of courts to 
contmue the evolutIonary process by whICh the pnvate attorney 
general theory was gradually developed. Courts would exerCIse 
broad discretIon m keepmg with the statutory and constitutIonal 
poliCIes to be enforced m the cases before them. 
At the same tIme, a statute such as that proposed by Repre­
sentatIve Dnnan would restore the uncertamty that charactenzed 
the pnvate attorney general line of cases as they stood at the tIme 
of Alyeska. 62 If thIS situatIon were merely restored, envlfonmental 
ld. §§ 1918(a), 1989(a). Similarly, the majority of antidiscnmmation fee provISIons 
contam Identical language, e.g., Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), e-5(k) (1976), Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, ld. § 
19731(e), and Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, amending ld. § 1988; 
and even where the language IS different (as with the Education Amendments of 
1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), and the FaIr Housmg Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) 
(1976)) the JudicIal mterpretation and legIslative hIstory have been SImilar. 
60. For example, there IS potential conflict between 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), 
for whICh fees are authonzed by the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 
1976, and 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976), the fee provIsIon of Title VIII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, both of whICh cover housmg discrImmation, but only one of 
whICh, § 3612(c), reqUIres showmg that plamtiff IS unable to afford counsel before 
an award can be made. 
61. H.R. 7696 & 8742, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
T the same effect would be proVISIOn whIch authOrIzed discretionary fees III 
public mterest cases alone III the mterests of justice, or one whICh authonzed fees to 
prIvate attorneys general. 
62. See note 29 supra. 
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protectIon mIght warrant fee shiftmg m Oklahoma but not m 
Tennessee, and the same suit brought m two different distncts 
mIght warrant fees m one court and not m the other It IS, per 
haps, easy enough to define a constitutional nght. But what IS a 
CIvil nght?63 It would be difficult for Congress to elimmate confu­
SIOn and uncertamty effectively m the language or legIslative hIs­
tory of such a broad genenc provlSlon. 64 Therefore, the degree of 
consIstency achIeved would depend upon JudicIal discretion, whiCh 
can never be certam. 
In areas m whiCh Congress can legIslate with greater specific­
ity it should do so, and thereby aVOid the problems of uncertamty 
and mconsistency In combmatIon with both specific and less broad 
genenc fee provlSlons, however, a broad, carefully drafted genenc 
statute would be useful. It would restore to the courts the power 
to fill m the mterstIces when Congress had not acted specifically If 
the courts were mstructed that the law provIded fees m cases un­
der legIslation or constitutional prOVISiOns expressmg specific sub­
stantive policy mconsistency mIght be mmimized. 
As genenc fee statutes become less broad, they become eaSIer 
for courts to handle. EnvIronmental protection, consumer protec­
tion, and housmg discnmmatIon are all relatively easy to recognIZe, 
even if they are not easy to define. Standards are eaSIer to draft 
when a more specific case IS mvolved, and the same standards can 
safely be applied to all cases withm the area. 65 ThIS does not mean, 
however, that less care need be taken m draftmg the standards. 
More care IS necessary because the prOVISIon will cover a greater 
number of cases than would the ordinary specific statute, and 
any mIstake would, therefore, affect more cases. 
63. See the confUSing diSCUSSIOn of Civil nghts, as used In 28 U.S.C. § 
1343(4) (1976), In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Orgamzation, 99 S. Ct. 1905, 
1916-17 (1979). 
64. While the differences among public Interest laws are much less strikIng 
than the differences between public Interest laws and laws InvolVIng prIvate Inter­
ests, these differences do eXist. Hence, the Similarities In fee provIsions for gIVen 
type of public Interest case (fees to "the prevailing party In Civil rIghts laws) do not 
necessarily carry over to fee proVISIOns In other public Interest areas (fees to any 
party In envIronmental laws). But, because fee awards In all of these cases are 
based upon the same rationale of encouragIng VIndication of strong congressIOnal 
poliCies, some of the broader techmcal questions could be answered, In only gen­
eral fashIOn, for such prOVISIOn. 
65. See note 59 supra. 
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II. DRAFTING THE STATUTE 
A. Standards for Recetpt 
The prevIOUS sectIon has discussed the ways Congress mIght 
define the areas m whIch attorneys fees can be awarded. In a sys­
tem m whIch attorneys fees are vIewed not as a regular means of 
mdemnifymg a prevailing litIgant, but as a means of promotmg na­
tIonal poliCIes, the selectIon of subject matter areas IS meanmgless, 
or even dangerous, unless there IS some limitatIon on the partIes 
who are eligible to recover fees m the covered areas. Thus, while 
the English routmely award fees m a neutral fashIOn to either SIde, 
m the United States, Congress must always specify m each of its 
fee statutes, mter alia, who may recover fees and how readily fees 
may be awarded. 
Almost mvarIably Congress has favored plamtiffs who were 
smng to enforce congressIOnal policIes. 66 As the number of fee pro­
VISIOns has grown, however, Congress method of achIevmg thIs 
goal has vaned. For many years, the sole format provIded manda­
tory fees to plamtiffs only when plamtiffs prevailed. More recently 
Congress has passed many statutes authonzmg a discretIonary fee 
award to plamtiffs or defendants, mamtammg the pro-plamtiff tradi­
tIon by establishmg different standards for awarding fees to prevail­
mg plamtiffs and prevailing defendants. Under the new "two-way" 
statutes, prevailing plamtiffs have been awarded fees almost as a 
matter of course, while defendants have been entitled to fees only 
rarely 
From the Enforcement Act of 187067 until the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 nearly a century later the major fee prOVISIons, except for 
those m cases mamly mvolvmg prIvate rIghts, limited eligibility to 
plamtiffs. Nineteenth century cases mvolvmg state attorneys fees 
statutes expressed grave doubts about the constitutIonality of one­
way" measures, and held many of them unconstitutIonal. 68 A dis­
tmctIon was soon drawn, however, favormg the validity of one-way 
statutes whICh authOrIzed fees m pursuance of a remedial statutory 
purpose. 69 Thus, m 1915, the Supreme Court upheld the prOVISIon 
of the Interstate Commerce Act7° whICh authOrIzed fees for plam­
66. But see note 28 supra. 

67 Ch. 64, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). 

68. Gulf C. & S.F.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). 
69. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899). 
70. 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1976). 
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tiffs only notmg that the fee authonzatIon was confined to cases 
wherem a recovery IS had for damages resultmg from the vIOlation 
of some duty Imposed m the public mterest by the act to regulate 
commerce, and that one purpose of the fee prOVISIOn was "to pro­
mote a closer observance of the dutIes so Imposed."71 
The same concept was applied several decades later by Judge 
Wyzanskt, m a case under the Frur Labor Standards Act: 
The rationale m all the federal statutes IS the same. The ar­
gument runs as follows. The government has set up a regulatory 
system for the benefit of persons m the plamtiffs class. To make 
the regulation effective pnvate suits as well as public prosecu­
tions are permitted. Suits by plamtiffs, if well founded, are m 
the public mterest. Therefore, the cost of prosecutmg successful 
suits should be borne not by those who were VIctims but by 
those who have VIOlated the regulations and caused the damage. 
The fear of thIS liability for double damages and attorney s fees 
not only aIds compliance, but promotes the settlement of contro­
verSieS at the conference table or m the admIlllstratIve office 
rather than the courts. No SImilar pomts, it IS thought, can be 
made for Imposmg on an unsuccessful plamtiff the costs of the 
defendant's lawyer. The defendant's vmdicatIon m a larger sense 
serves the mterests of Justice, but no more so than the successful 
defense of any suit. Therefore, the public IS not more mterested 
m aIding hIm than any other successful defendant. Moreover, to 
allow hIm to recover hIS out-of-pocket expenses would deter 
suits by the plamtiffs who under the FaIr Labor Standards Act, 
the Interstate Commerce Act, the Ann Trust Acts, the Packers 
and Stockyards Act and so forth are assumed, often correctly to 
be necessitous persons reqmnng the protective hand of the leg­
Islature. Such deterrence runs counter to the policy of the Act m 
placmg reliance for enforcement both upon pnvate suits and 
public suits. 72 
Because the Amencan custom calls for statutory attorneys fees 
only m order to effectuate congressIOnal policy the pattern de­
scribed m Hutchmson v. William C Barry, Inc. 73 guaranteemg 
fees to plamtiffs while denymg them to defendants, IS the appropn­
ate type of attorneys fees statute, or at least the appropnate start­
mg pomt. In fact, none of our statutes, save those mamly dealing 
71. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 433 (1915). 
72. Hutchmson William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F Supp. 292, 298 (D. Mass. 1943) 
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976». 
73. ld. 
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with pnvate nghts, has ever departed m any sIgnificant respect 
from thIS model. 
There have been, however vanatIons m the language of these 
prOVlSlons, some of whICh could have allowed for sIgnificant 
changes from the traditIonal and appropnate Hutchmson pattern. 
Begmmng with the fee prOVlSlons m the Civil Rights Act of 1964,74 
Congress has passed a number of fee prOVISIOns that authonze fees, 
rather than mandate them, to "the prevailing party "75 to any 
party "76 or to a party who has substantIally prevailed. "77 ThIS lan­
guage had the potentIal for producmg far-reachmg and IrratIonal 
changes m the pattern of Amencan fee statutes, either by watenng 
down the entitlement of plamtiffs to collect fees, or, more danger 
ously by makmg defendants eligible for fees to such an extent that 
plamtiffs would be deterred and litIgatIon to enforce natIonal poli­
CIes chilled. 78 
These statutes, however, have been neither mtended nor con­
strued m that way Instead, they have been uniformly construed to 
make only slight modificatIOns m the Hutchmson pattern. Under 
the two-way discretIonary fee provISIOns, plamtiffs almost always 
are entitled to fees and defendants rarely are awarded them. In the 
more recent fee provlSlons, thIS dual standard has been spelled out 
either m the statutory language79 or m the legIslatIve hIstOry 80 In 
the earliest two-way public mterest fee prOVlSlons, Titles II and VII 
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) to e-5(k) (1976). 
75. E.g., ld; Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (1976); Civil Rights Attorney 
Fees Awards Act of 1976, ld. §§ 1981, 1988. 
76. E.g., Ocean Dumpmg Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1976); Water Pollution 
Prevention & Control Act, Id. § 1365(d); Clean Alr Act Amendments of 1970, 42 
U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d). 
77 E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); Pnvacy 
Act, ld. § 552a(g)(l)(2)(B). 
78. Not smgle fee prOVlSlOn Congress has ever passed, aSlde from the Norns­
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1976), has permitted the ready recovery of fees 
by defendants. Thls lS true even for those fee provlslOns protecting pnvate nghts, 
under whlch neither plamtiffs nor defendants may recover readily. See, e.g., Phillips 
Petroleum Co. Esso Standard Oil, 185 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1950) (patents); Steak & 
Brew, Inc. v. Beef & Brew Restaurant, Inc., 370 F Supp. 1030 (S.D. Ill. 1974) (trade­
marks); Davls E.!. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 F Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 
(copynghts). 
79. E.g., Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2805(d)(I), (3) (West 
Cum. Supp. 1979); Fau Debt Collection Practices Act, ld. § 1692k(a)(3). 
80. E.g., S. REP No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976); H.R. REP No. 1558, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1976); 122 CONGo REc. 32185 (1976) (remarks of Sen. John 
Tunney) (Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976). 
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, neither the statute nor the debates 
shed any light on how the provlSlons should be Interpreted. The 
Supreme Court, In a paIr of unanImous declSlons a decade apart, 
made it clear that the proper constructIon, for that Act and any 
other one with similar language, IS a dual standard close to the 
Hutchtnson rule. 
In 1968, In Newman v. Piggte Park Enterpnses, Inc. 81 the 
Supreme Court held In a suit to enforce the public accommoda­
tIons prOVlSlons of the Civil Rights Act that a prevailing plaIntiff 
was a pnvate attorney general, the type of litIgant whom Congress 
Intended to encourage to seek Judicial relief. "82 The proper 
standard for awarding attorneys fees to such a plaIntiff was, there­
fore, broad: "It follows that one who succeeds In obtaInIng an In­
JunctIon under [the public accommodatIons] Title should ordinarily 
recover an attorney s fee unless special circumstances would render 
such an award unjust. "83 
Ten years later, the Supreme Court turned to the standard for 
a defendant who prevails In a sImilar suit. In Chnsttansburg Gar 
ment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportumty Commtsston,84 an em­
ployment discnmInatIon suit under title VII of the 1964 Act, a 
prevailing defendant argued that the neutrality of the statutory lan­
guage entitled it to fees on an equal footIng with a prevailing 
plaIntiff. The Supreme Court responded unanImously' "[T]he per 
mISSive and discretIonary language of the statute does not even In­
vite, let alone reqUIre, such a mechanIcal constructIOn. "85 Rather, 
the Court contInued, the congressIOnal policy reqUIred that plaIn­
tiffs and defendants be treated differently 86 so that defendants 
were entitled to fees only under a very narrow standard, rather 
than under the broad Newman standard. 87 
81. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
82. Id. at 402. 
83. Id. 
84. 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
85. Id. at 418. 
86. First, as emphasized so forcefully m Piggle Park, the plaintiff IS the 
chosen mstrument of Congress to vmdicate policy that Congress conSid­
ered of the highest priority Second, when district court awards counsel 
fees to prevailing plamtiff, it IS awarding them agamst vIOlator of federal 
law As the Court of Appeals clearly perceived, "these policy conSiderations 
whICh support the award of fees to prevailing plamtiff are not present III 
the case of prevailing defendant. 
Id. at 418-19 (citation omitted). 
87. "[AJ district court may m its discretion award attorney fees to prevailing 
defendant m Title VII case upon finding that the plamtiff' action was frivolous, 
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In some fee prOVISIOns, Congress has attempted to make cov­
erage even more specific by distIngUIshIng among different catego­
nes of plaIntiffs eligible for fees and defendants agaInst whom fees 
mIght be assessed. For example, the FaIr HOUSIng Act of 1968 au­
thonzes discretIonary fees to plaIntiffs alone, but only if they can­
not afford to pay a fee. 88 A recent vanatIon of thIs theme has ap­
peared In two statutes governIng certaIn specific types of regulatory 
proceedings. Two prOVlSlons In the Public Utility Regulatory Proce­
dures Act,89 passed In 1978, allow fees In specific regulatory proceed­
mgs to prevailing Intervenors who meet tests of finanCial hardship. 90 
Similarly the United States always has been treated m a man­
ner different from other plamtiffs or defendants. In cases m whICh 
the United States IS entitled to brmg suit, an applicable fee prOVI­
SIOn will always specifY that fees are available to the prevailing 
party other than the United States. 91 Under no federal attorneys 
fees prOVISIon IS the United States entitled to recover fees. 92 On 
the other Side, the eXIstence of a general United States Govern-
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought m subjective bad 
faith. [d. at 421 (1978). The Supreme Court warned lower courts not to engage m 
post-hoc analysIs makmg it too easy to deCide a case was fnvolous. The growmg 
number of defendants fees (some from Judges who have never found for a plamtifl' 
m an employment discrlmmation case) suggests that the Supreme Court' warnmg IS 
bemg Ignored. 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). Courts have construed thiS to mean mability to 
pay reasonable fee (whICh may often be quite large), but not reqUlrmg pauper sta­
tus. See, e.g., Moore Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975). But see Stevens v. 
Dobs, Inc., 373 F Supp. 618 (E.D.N.C. 1974). 
89. 16 U.S.C.A. §§825q-l(b)(2), 2632(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
90. Several other acts have mcluded legislative history to the same effect. See, 
e.g., S. REP No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974), repnnted In [1974] 3 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6285 (Freedom of Information Act). Limitations of thiS 
sort are most frequently seen m bills whICh concern administrative hearmgs and 
agencies. It may be preferable m such Instances to narrow or further define the types 
of proceedings covered, rather than to draw distinctions among classes of mtervenors 
who would be eligible. See note 57 supra. 
91. See, e.g., Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976); Education Amendments of 
1972, 20 U .S.C. § 1617 (1976); State and Local Fiscal ASSistance Amendments of 
1976, 31 U.S.C. § 1244(e) (1976); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 19731(e) (1976); Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Id. §§ 2000a-3(b) 
to e-5(k). 
92. Of course, the Legal Services Corporation, while federally funded, IS not 
the United States for purposes of attorneys fee awards. The Corporation may be as­
sessed fees if its employees or clients engage m groundless, fnvolous or vexatious 
litigation, 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(f) (1976), see A/yeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness 
Soc y, 421 U.S. 240, 262n.36 (1975), and may receive attorneys fees under federal 
fee provIsions. [d. See also, e.g., Rios V. Enterprise Ass Steamfitters Local 638, 542 
F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976); Hoitt V. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1974); Kulkarni V. 
NyqUist, 466 F Supp. 1274 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). 
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ment Immunity statute, sectIon 2412,93 has the effect of elimmatmg 
the federal government from the category of covered defendants as 
well, unless there IS an explicit mtentIon shown to waIve thIS Im­
munity For thIS reason, the statutes under whICh litIgatIon agamst 
the federal government IS specIally desIred by Congress generally 
have a prOVISIon authonzmg fees agamst the United States. A ma­
Jor example IS the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,94 whICh specifically authonzed employment dis­
cnmmatIon litIgatIon agamst the federal government based on ex­
tensIve legIslatIve hIstory showmg Congress awareness that the 
United States was engaged m WIdespread employment discnmma­
tIon. 95 
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976). 
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976). 
95. In recent years there has been steady trend m the very rational direction 
of putting the United States on the same footing as other parties m paymg fees. The 
1972 amendments to title VII are prmclpal example, because they simply Imposed 
upon the Government the same equal employment obligations, mcluding payment of 
attorneys fees, as those born by all other employers. 
For the past three or four years, however, attempts have been made to Impose 
upon the United States obligations borne by no other litigant, private or public, m 
this country or any other. While on the surface bills makmg the United States and 
federal agencies liable for fees whenever they lose almost any Civil case may seem to 
resemble traditional attorneys fee legislation, m fact such bills are not only wholly 
unprecedented one-way omnibus legislation, but also legislation which would retard, 
rather than augment, the poliCies of Congress. See, e.g., note 58 supra. 
An extreme example of this type of legislation was S. 1001, whICh passed the 
Senate In 1977 as an amendment to the Legal Services Corporation Act. See note 58 
supra. This year, the Senate passed Similar bill, S. 265. Id. Although this bill tones 
down some of the more extreme features of S. 1001, it remaInS wholly unprece­
dented and dangerous omnibus legislation, contrary to both the fonn and alms of all 
prevIous fee proVISIOns. 
Fees are mandated m all Civil cases under S. 265 (except tort cases and except 
where an eXisting statute proVides different rules) for any plaIntiff, defendant, or par­
tiCipant In an admmlstrative adjudication who prevails agaInst the United States or 
federal agency unless the federal government or agency can show that its position 
was substantially Justified. Fees cannot be awarded an mdivldual whose net worth IS 
more than $1 million, or bUSIness worth more than $5 million. T emphaSize the 
nsks to the Government, S. 265 reqUires that any fee award be taken out of the par­
ticular office or agency budget, whICh may not be supplemented for that purpose. 
First, thiS bill would have greater Impact than any fee legislation before it. Be­
cause the federal government IS the prmclpal litigator m the federal courts, S. 265 
would have enonnous scope. The CongressIOnal Budget Office estimated that under 
S. 265 fees would be awarded agaInst the United States and its agencies In nme 
thousand cases year, for total of more than $108 million. S. REP No. 253, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). No figures are available for companson, but it seems likely 
that both the caseload and dollar amounts are at least ten times the totals for awards 
under all eXisting attorneys fee proVISIOns combmed. 
Second, many of the cases In whICh fees would be awarded agaInst the federal 
government would be pnvate cases, rangIng from cases InvolVIng condemnation and 
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The selectIon of subject matter areas and limitatIons on cover­
age of plamtiffs and defendants are not the only techmques for 
shapmg an attorneys fee prOVlSlon, but they are probably the most 
unportant. When the purpose of a fee provIsIon differs substantIally 
from the customary one of encouragmg citIZens to sue m the pub­
lic mterest, as it does III the areas of copynghts, trademarks, and 
patents, Congress has not limited the coverage of plamtiffs and de­
fendants, but mstead, has limited the readiness with whICh fees 
should be awarded. 96 Similarly statutes whICh provIde mandatory 
attornevs fees along with damages may suggest that a Judgment IS 
reqmred for entitlement to a fee award,97 while the two-way dis-
forfeiture to cases mvolvmg government contracts and other unconnected categones, 
m whICh there has been no showmg of any necessity for such legislation. There IS 
no statute anywhere m the world whICh provides fees to one Side alone m purely 
pnvate cases, nor IS there III the United States statute mvolvmg pnvate nghts 
whICh allows the assessment of fees m the absence of exceptional circumstances. 
While the coverage of so great variety of pnvate cases, under standards whICh 
allow ready recovery for one Side alone, IS departure of enormous magnitude, the 
true danger of S. 265 and other similar measures, IS that they provide fees to defen­
dants who successfully aVOid attempts at enforcement of congressIOnal poliCies. Un­
der all of our prevIOus fee statutes, plamtiffs have never had to prove good faith, or 
substantial Justification (a much harder test), to aVOid fee assessment. Rather, de­
fendants have had to prove either bad faith or some vanation of bad faith on the part 
of plamtiffs m order to obtam fees. A major portion of the government' litigation IS 
statutory enforcement proceedings, such as voting suits to protect the nghts of black 
voters, OSHA cases to allow employees to work m safety, or FDA proceedings to 
keep dangerous drugs off the market. In these cases, the government IS pursumg the 
national Interest m protecting nghts that Congress has guaranteed to its citizens. Un­
der S. 265, the government as plamtiff would be unable to add to its budget when it 
succeeded In enforcmg congressIOnal poliCies, but would be deterred from Initiating 
enforcement proceedings by the prospect of budget reduction whICh could not be 
Indemnified by additional appropnations. 
ObvIOusly, the fact that the government could aVOid fee liability by showmg 
substantial Justification for the position it unsuccessfully advanced, and the fact 
that the very nch would be Ineligible for fees, would limit somewhat the damage 
that S. 265 and its relatives would do to enforcement of our laws. There can be little 
doubt, however, that the damage would be substantial. 
Through the years, Congress has carefully deSigned attorneys fee provIsions to 
foster law enforcement by encouraging the work of pnvate attorneys general. ThiS 
bill would undermine all that work by its meat-ax approach to the critical enforce­
ment work of the public Attorney General. 
96. Fee provISIons m both the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976), and the 
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976), limit fees to exceptional cases. While the lan­
guage of the Copynght Act fee prOVISIon, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976), does not contam 
thiS explicit limitation, it has been mterpreted In pan passu with the other proVI­
sions. See, e.g., note 78 supra. 
97. E.g., Motor VehICle InformatIOn and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1918(a), 
1989(a)(2) (1976). 
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cretlonary statutes have generally been construed to allow a court 
to award fees upon a consent decree. 98 
These differences all have effects on the operatlon of our laws 
that go far beyond what one mIght expect from the relatively mmor 
differences m the wording of the attorney s fee prOVlSlons. For thIS 
reason, the preCIse wording of fee prOVISiOns IS of vital Importance 
to effectuate the purposes for whiCh Congress passes them. 
B. Precfse Wording 
If an attorneys fees prOVISIon IS to be applied exactly as Con­
gress mtends, Congress must scrutImze, carefully every word con­
tamed m the provlSlon. A careless attitude on the part of Congress 
can result not only m attorneys fee prOVISiOns whiCh are meffectlVe 
or anomalous, but also m proVISIons whiCh are extremely counter 
productive. 
Section 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972,99 for ex­
ample, authonzes fees "upon the entry of a final order by a court 
of the United States. The reqmrement of a final order may 
have been a legIslative compromIse, or it SImply may have been an 
expenment with a new form of fee legIslation. ThIS IS now partlcu­
larly eVIdent m school desegregatIOn cases, whIch often drag on for 
a decade or more, as an example of the type of draftmg whiCh 
breeds confuSIon. Fortunately the Supreme Court, m Bradley v. 
School Board,lOo mterpreted the prOVlSlon as granting a Judge dis­
cretion to award fees and costs mCIdent to the final disposition of 
mtenm matters. "101 The legIslative hIStOry of section 718 gave no 
mdicatIon whether the wording was mtended to reqmre that a case 
be completed pnor to an award, or whether the Supreme Court's 
mterpretatIon was correct. In thIS one mstance, little damage was 
done, but thIS defect could have senously thwarted Congress pur 
pose. 
Similarly the Clayton Act102 fee prOVlSlon mandates an award 
of fees to anyone "injured m hIS busmess or property by reason of 
98. See, e.g., Barrett v. Kalinowski, 458 F Supp. 689 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Regalado 
v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act 
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)); Parker v. Matthews, 411 F Supp. 1059 (D. D.C. 
1976) (Title VII of tlie Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976)); Aspua 
of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Education Amend­
ments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976)). 
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). 
100. 416 U.S. 696 (1974). 
101. ld. at 723. 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 
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anythmg forbIdden m the antitrust laws. "103 The wording of 
the prOVlSlon, reqmnng a showmg of mJury prevented payment of 
fees to those who were successful m enJommg antitrust vIOlations, 
so that litigants who prevented the vIOlations receIved neither 
damages nor fees, while litigants who receIved treble damages for 
the VIOlations also were awarded fees. ThIS extreme anomaly finally 
was elimmated by passage of a fee section m the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 whICh authonzed fees m anti­
trust mJunctIon cases. 104 
An example of a prOVISIon m whICh Congress did proceed 
carefully IS the Allen Amendment, that portion of the Civil Rights 
Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976 whIch authonzes fees to 
a taxpayer who prevails "in any CIvil action or proceedings, by or 
on behalf of the United States of Amenca, to enforce, or chargmg a 
VIOlation of, a prOVISIon of the United States Internal Revenue 
Code. "105 ThIS genenc proVISIon withm a genenc prOVISIon 
was drafted to prOVIde a small measure of relief for taxpayers m the 
most extreme cases, and its preCIse wording has accomplished Just 
that purpose. 
The Allen Amendment was mserted m the Senate bill (S. 
2278)106 whICh became the 1976 Act, as a compromIse. Proponents 
of the bill, who were mterested m passmg a prOVISIon to enhance 
CIvil nghts, accepted the Amendment as a way to end a filibuster 
by Senator James Allen of Alabama. After seven days of debate, 
the Allen Amendment was adopted unammously 107 and debate on 
the Senate bill Immediately came to a close. While proponents of 
the bill were willing to accept the Allen Amendment as a means of 
ending the Senator s filibuster they carefully made sure, m several 
ways, that the effect of theIr conceSSIOn would be mimmai. 
First, and most vitally the Amendment's preCIse wording al­
lows a taxpayer to recover fees m a suit only when brought "by or 
on behalf of the United States. "108 In almost all tax litIgation, 
of course, it IS the taxpayer who, havmg paid a challenged assess­
103. ld. 
104. ld. § 26. 
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 
106. S. 2278, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976). 
107. 122 CONGo REC. 33312 (1976). ThIS vote was taken after floor manager of 
S. 2278 mdicated that the Amendment was acceptable. ld. (remarks of Sen. James 
Abourezk). Senator James Allen mdicated that the filibuster would end if the 
Amendment were adopted. 122 CONGo REC. 33311 (1976). 
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 
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ment, sues for a refund. 109 Second, repeated statements made dur­
mg debate over the bill m both Houses showed that Congress m­
tended the prOVlSlons to be mterpreted exactly as written. 110 
Speakers m both Houses were also careful to pomt out that, even 
m those few tax cases m whICh the United States was a plamtiff, 
the standard applied to a prevailing taxpayer would be that applied 
to other prevailing defendants under the Senate bill; that IS, the 
taxpayer could receIve fees only when the United States had 
brought suit fnvolously or vexatiously 111 
One Judge has opmed that Congress was SImply unaware that 
taxpayers are almost always plamtiffs m tax litigation, and did not 
realize that the Allen Amendment would have so mmor an ef­
fect. 112 Several commentators have agreed with thIS assessment. 113 
109. [Wjhen the Government asserts and the taxpayer demes liability for 
tax, the Internal Revenue laws are so framed that it IS the taxpayer who 
must sue. If the taxpayer should wait for the Government to sue him, he 
would allow the assessment to become final, and hiS nght to contest hiS lia­
bility would be gone forever. 
Aparacor, Inc. v. United States, 571 F.2d 552, 558 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (en banc) (Nichols, J. 
concurrmg). 
llO. Proponents of S. 2278 took care to specify that only taxpayer defendants 
could collect fees almost every time they spoke about the Allen Amendment. See, 
e.g., CONGo REC. 33312 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy); Id. (remarks 
of Sen. John Tunney); 122 CONGo REC. 35114 (1976) (remarks of Rep. John 
Anderson); 122 CONGo REC. 35116 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Robert McClory); 122 
CONGo REc. 35124 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeler). Representative 
Drman, floor leader of the bill m the House, pomted out at one time that the 
Amendment would not apply to actions mstituted agamst the Government by the 
taxpayer. 122 CONGo REC. 35122 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Robert Drman). Even Sen­
ator Allen, sponsor of the Amendment, the only time he referred to the Amendment, 
said: 
What it does IS to add to the Civil nghts attorneys fees proVISIOn pro­
vIsion that if the Internal Revenue Service or the U.S. Government bnngs 
Civil action agamst taxpayer, then the court, m its discretion, Just as m the 
other cases, would be entitled to award the taxpayer reasonable attorneys 
fees. That IS all it does, and I hope the amendment will be agreed to. 
122 CONGo REC. 33311 (1976) (remarks of Sen. James Allen). 
llI. See, e.g., 122 CONGo REC. 33312 (1976) (remarks of Sen. John Tunney); 
122 CONGo REC. 33312-13 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Ted Kennedy); 122 CONGo REC. 
35115 (1976) (remarks of Rep. John Anderson); 122 CONGo REC. 35116 (1976) (re­
marks of Reps. Robert McClory and Robert Drman); 122 CONGo REC. 35123 (1976) 
(remarks of Rep. Robert Drman); 122 CONGo REc. 35126 (1976) (remarks of Rep. 
Robert Kastenmeler). 
112. Aparacor, Inc. United States, 571 F.2d 552, 558 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (en banc) 
(Nichols, J. concurrmg). 
113. See generally Pollack, Attorneys Fees In Tax Litigation: RemedYing the 
'Substantive Imbalance, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV 53 (1978); Comment, Court 
Awarded Attorneys Fees In Tax Litigation: 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 126 U. PA. L. REV 
1368 (1978). 
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The Senate floor leaders, who were responsible for agreemg with 
Senator Allen on the wording of an acceptable amendment, knew 
what effect the wording would have. 114 While Senator Allen subse­
quently mdicated that he had mtended the Amendment to have far 
broader applicatIon,115 what he and those who Jomed hIm m both 
the filibuster and sponsorshIp of the Allen Amendment116 thought 
IS of no moment, except for students of legIslatIve tactIcs and the 
legIslatIve process. Neither Allen nor hIS cosponsors voted for final 
passage of the bill, even as amended. While those senators not re­
sponsible for shepherding the bill or filibustermg for its acceptance 
may not have known that taxpayers are almost always plamtiffs, 
they could not have expected wIdespread applicatIon of the Allen 
Amendment. All those present at the debates heard floor state­
ments made both before acceptance of the Amendment117 and after 
passage of the bill118 that the Amendment would apply only to 
those cases m whICh the government acted m bad faith. 119 
A number of tax lawyers and other commentators have tned to 
recast the Allen Amendment as they Wish Congress had drafted it, 
Ignormg the reality of what Congress did. They have emphaSIzed 
the mmor effect the prOVlSlon has had,120 and have argued agamst 
114. Most tellingly, Senator John Tunney, ongmal sponsor of S. 2278, dealt 
with potential hole by specifymg, before adoption of the Amendment, that it 
would not apply to situation where the Government IS plamtiff on appeal smce 
the Government did not brmg the action m the first mstance. 122 CONGo REc. 
33312 (1976). 
115. 123 CONGo REC. S732 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1977) (remarks of Sen. James 
Allen). 
116. Cosponsors of the Amendment were also those who had, from time to time 
dunng the debate, JOined m the filibuster with Senator Allen: Senators Jesse Helms 
of North Carolina, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, and William Scott of 
Virgmla. 
117. 122 CONGo REC. 33312 (1976) (remarks of Sen. John Tunney). 
118. 122 CONGo REc. 33312-13 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). 
119. The same IS true on the House Side, where the Congressmen were told by 
the House floor leader that fees would be allowed under the Allen Amendment only 
m umque and really Impossible Circumstances, and that the cost of the Amend­
ment to the federal government would be negligible because of the Amendment' 
limited application. 122 CONGo REC. 35116, 35122 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Robert 
Drman). 
120. There have been but two fee awards under the Allen Amendment smce its 
adoption more than three years ago. United States V. Garnson Construct. Co., (1977) 
2 U.S. Tax Cas. ~ 9705, at 88,387 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Levno v. United States, 440 F 
Supp. 8, 11 (D. Mont. 1977). The latter Ignored the Amendment' wording and legiS­
lative history. But those who argue that Congress could not possibly have mtended 
such limited result should be aware that there have been no awards made under 
either § 1985 or § 1986, two other provIsIOns for whICh the Civil Rights Attorney 
Fees Awards Act of 1976 authonzes fees. 
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a literal" and "too techmcal" reading of the Amendment,121 as­
summg that Congress must have mtended to do more. Although 
courts have, with one exceptIon,122 followed precIsely the mstruc­
tIons of Congress, they have called the wording of the Allen 
Amendment ambIguous" and have mvented "confusIOn m the 
courts because of its supposed ambIguity and its "unclear and m­
consIstent" legIslatIve hIstory 123 Any legIslatIon, however can be 
called ambIguous, unclear, and mconsistent when gIVen an mter 
pretatIon whICh was unmtended by its drafters. 
The argument that the Allen Amendment should be gIVen an 
mterpretatIon not permitted by its terms, so that it can be one of 
the most sIgnificant developments for the future of tax law (and tax 
lawyers),"124 overlooks the care and deliberatIon with whICh the 
bill was drafted. The argument rests on the premIse that Congress, 
m the mIdst of cruCIal debate over the long-studiedl25 subject of 
fee awards that would make it possible for CIvil nghts litIgants 
(many of them poor and of mmority groups) to brmg suits to end 
raCIal and sex discnmmatIon and enforce long-neglected constitu­
tIonal nghts, suddenly diverted from that path so that they could 
casually enact an enormously far-reachmg change m the hIghly 
techmcal field of fundamental tax enforcement policy for the bene­
fit of those wealthy mdividuais and corporate taxpayers who feel 
that they have been overcharged enough to merit litIgatIOn. With 
all due respect to those who put thIS theory forward, it somehow 
seems more sensible to read the law as Congress wrote it. 
121. Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees m Tax Litigation: 42 V.S.C. § 
1988, 126 U. PA. L. REv 1368, 1376 (1978). 
122. See note 120 supra. 
123. Comment, supra note 121, at 1386. 
124. B. BITTKER, L. STONE & A. WARREN, JR., FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION 261 (Supp. 1977). See also ZifI'ren, Tilting at the IRS Windmill? 
Take Heart, The Los Angeles Times, May 11, 1977 § 2, at 5, col. 4. 
125. Congress began In-depth study of the Issue of court-awarded attorneys 
fees In 1973. Heanngs on The Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representa­
tion Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Sen. Comm. 
on the Judic,ary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Further hearings were held by the 
House In the wake of Alyeska several years later, Heanngs on Awarding of Attor­
neys Fees Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admm,stration 
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judicwry, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), and 
specifically on the Issue of attorneys fees awards against the Federal Government 
two and half years after that. Heanngs on The Awarding of Attorneys Fees m Fed­
eral Courts Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Adm,mstration 
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judicwry, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 
(1977-78). 
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As the Allen Amendment shows, courts do mterpret the laws 
as Congress writes them, and because they do, extreme care must 
be taken to aVOid language the techmcal mterpretatIon of whICh 
makes possible unmtended results. The placement of certam lan­
guage must be exammed carefully 126 and the most well under 
stood terms of art must be scrutImzed127 lest a fee prOVISIOn be 
gIven a broader or narrower effect than mtended. 
CONCLUSION 
Alyeska Pipeline SerVlce Co. v Wilderness Soclety128 stated 
the Amencan rule: "In the United States, the prevailing litIgant IS 
ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys fee from 
the loser "129 That case has made it necessary to recogmze that the 
real Amencan rule, every bit as deeply rooted m our hIstory and 
m congreSSIOnal policy "130 IS that attorneys fees are granted m the 
United States to pnvate parties who act as agents of public policy 
Statutory prOVISIOns authonzmg fees--t-O--pnvate attorneys gen­
eral are not exceptIons to, but an mtegral part of, the Amencan 
rule. Those many prOVlSlons whICh Congress has passed over more 
than a century have not been, as may appear on the surface, hap­
126. For example, the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of 1976, as 
amended by the Allen Amendment, read: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce proVISIOn of sections 1977, 1978, 
1979, 1980 and 1981 of the ReVIsed Statutes, title IX of Public Law 92-318, 
or In any CIVil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of 
Amenca, to enforce, or charging vIolation of, proVISIOn of the United 
States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
court, In its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney fee as part of the costs. 
122 CONGo REC. 33315 (1976) (Allen Amendment italiCIzed). 
Had the Amendment been Included withIn the ongInal language of the proVI­
SIOn, the placement of the Amendment mIght have been read to preclude fees In 
suits under title VI unless such suits were Initiated by the United States. 
127. AgaIn, the Allen Amendment Includes the term action or proceeding 
to enforce Some have argued that the word proceeding Includes the sending 
of tax defiCIency notice to taxpayer by the Internal Revenue ServIce; hence the 
taxpayer who subsequently files suit contesting the determInation of defiCIency IS 
defendant In proceeding, even if plaIntiff In an action, to enforce the Internal 
Revenue Code. While courts have rejected thIS, and SImilar, arguments, see, e.g., 
Aparacor, Inc. v. United States, 571 F.2d 552, 553-56 (Ct. CI. 1978) (en banc); Engel 
v. United States, 448 F Supp. 201, 202 (W.D. Pa. 1978), fee legIslation should be 
drafted with preCISIon, to aVOId even the possibility that such arguments mIght be 
accepted. 
128. 421 U.S. at 240. 
129. Id. at 247 
130. Id. at 271. 
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hazard. Rather they have all fit thIs pattern. As Congress begms to 
rely even more heavily on the prIvate attorney general, it must ex­
amme the dimenSIOns, standards, and wording of its ever mcreas­
mg number of fee statutes lest it madvertently abrogate the true 
AmerIcan rule. 
